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Abstract 
Informal finance consists of a heterogeneous set of individual and group financial 
arrangements. Information and transaction cost advantages are effectively used to offer a 
wide variety of services, especially to the rural poor who lack access to formal finance. It 
is difficult, however, to correctly assess the role of informal finance in the development 
process due to its complexity and the lack of a single framework to study its characteristics 
and performance. Therefore, divergent conclusions and policy recommendations have been 
developed, including benign neglect, regulating informal finance, and encouraging formal-
informal linkages. This paper argues that the formulation of more appropriate policies 
requires further research to develop a consistent framework to conceptualize and empirically 
study informal finance. 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF INFORMAL FINANCE 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: 
by 
Richard L. Meyer and Geetha Nagarajan· 
INTRODUCTION 
During more than two decades, formal financial markets have been emphasized by 
policymakers in their attempt to direct more credit into rural areas in pursuit of production 
and income goals. Informal finance and especially moneylenders have often been con-
sidered to be exploitative and a hindrance to modernizing agriculture. Policies have often 
been employed, therefore, with an explicit objective of increasing formal finance and 
diminishing the role of informal finance. 
But the supply-leading approach to formal finance has largely failed (Adams, Graham 
and Von Pischke). Loan quotas and targets set for commercial banks have not led to sus-
tained agricultural lending. Interest rate controls and special small farmer credit projects 
have not resulted in large amounts of lending to small farmers because larger farmers have 
received most of the cheap loans. Agricultural development banks and cooperatives speci-
fically established to lend to agriculture have often failed or are saddled with huge 
nonperforming assets. Ironically, in areas where formal finance temporarily displaced 
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informal finance, the latter is now reemerging and is once again the main source of financial 
services for most rural firms and households. 
Researchers and policymakers have rediscovered informal finance. But unlike earlier 
times when informal finance was considered exploitative, today the predominant view is that 
informal finance may play a useful role in developing countries. It may be the only viable 
financial source in the short term, and may have certain informational and cost advantages 
so it will continue to exist even when the formal financial system has become better 
developed. 
Analyzing and understanding informal finance presents a challenge for two reasons. 
First, informal finance consists of a complex set of individual and group financial arrange-
ments and contracts. Second, unlike the use of bank-firm theory for formal finance, there 
is no standard framework for studying informal finance. Frequently, therefore, widely 
divergent conclusions and policy recommendations are presented about the role of informal 
finance in development process. 
The purposes of this paper are to briefly describe the wide variety of arrangements 
and contracts that exist in informal finance, to discuss some of the approaches used to study 
it, and to summarize the policy alternatives that emerge from recent studies. The paper is 
divided into three parts. The first describes informal finance, the second briefly discusses 
theories and frameworks used in informal finance studies, and the third discusses policies. 
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INFORMAL FINANCE IN 1HE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
No standard definition exists for informal finance. 1 Table 1 presents examples of 
several financial arrangements found in financial systems in developing countries. These 
arrangements could be arranged along a continuum from most formal (a bank) to least 
formal (family and friends) but for simplicity's sake they are classified into formal, semi-
formal, and informal. 
The formal financial system has three components. The first is the Central Bank and 
other regulatory and prudential institutions that establish the financial rules of the game for 
most formal institutions, and sometimes for semi-formal and informal finance. The second 
is a wide variety of financial institutions that provide financial services directly to savers and 
borrowers. They have been the focus of most supply-leading financial policies. The third 
component represents capital markets, but they generally play an insignificant role in low 
income countries. 
Semi-formal finance includes those financial arrangements that fall between formal 
and informal. Usually they are not regulated and supervised by the same regulatory 
authorities as formal finance, but they may have some official sanctions such as being 
licensed and audited by a Cooperative Registrar. They may also have formal written 
statutes and operating procedures. Some are actively encouraged, assisted, and subsidized 
by NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) and PVOs (Private Voluntary Organizations), 
or governments and donor agencies. Due to the failure of formal finance in many countries, 
semi-formal financial arrangements have recently become the focus of increased government 
and donor attention. 
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Informal finance includes a heterogeneous set of individual and group financial 
arrangements. Most fall outside the scope of government support and regulation, although 
some countries have usury and other laws intended to cover them. Some types of informal 
finance are autonomous, while others emerge as a reaction to the repression of formal 
finance (Chandavarkar). Some have strong links to formal finance, such as the input 
supplier who borrows from formal institutions and sell inputs on credit, while others operate 
completely outside the formal system. 
Informal finance is often loosely defined to include both the financial arrangements 
classified here as semi-formal and informal. Several attributes can be identified for informal 
finance. 
1. Heterogeneity. Informal finance includes a wide variety of institutional forms and, 
within any one type, a variety of financial contracts between savers and borrowers can be 
found. The frequency with which these financial arrangements are found varies widely: 
Africa and Asia seem to have a greater variety of informal finance arrangements than Latin 
America, for example. 
2. Services. Informal finance offers both loan and savings services, unlike supply-
leading finance which often ignores savings. Many types of informal finance also off er 
marketing and other services. 
3. Specialization. Some informal financial arrangements serve a broad clientele but 
informational problems often encourage specialization. For example, moneykeepers, 
moneylenders, and trader lenders often provide only one type of financial service and it is 
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limited to those clients for which the supplier has good information. This specialization may 
provide efficient services but also limits access to new clients. 
4. Access. Informal finance is used by the rich and the poor, but often it is the only 
source for the poor while it is an alternative source for the rich. 
5. Collateral. Like formal finance, some informal financial arrangements may 
require collateral for loans (e.g., credit unions, pawnshops), but frequently informal finance 
has developed effective collateral substitutes through interlinked contracts, peer monitoring, 
and group lending. 
6. Interest rates and transaction costs. Moneylenders have been criticized for 
charging exploitative interest rates on loans, but other types of informal lenders such as 
farmers, friends, and relatives often charge no interest at all. Some credit unions have 
experienced difficulty because they have not charged rates high enough to cover costs and 
inflation. What tends to distinguish informal finance is the relative low transaction costs for 
savers and borrowers because of close proximity and a minimum of formal procedures. 
7. Growth and decline. It is difficult to conclusively determine the trends of informal 
finance. In countries as diverse as Brazil and the Philippines, it appears that informal fi-
nance has increased with the decline of formal financial institutions. Credit unions are 
expanding in Togo and the Cameroon, but declining in Ecuador and other countries with 
high inflation. The large informal sector observed in many countries implies that informal 
finance will also be large. 
8. Contribution to development. Clearly, informal finance is already contributing 
to development because it is often the only source of financial services for the poor, the 
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landless, and those living in isolated regions. The question frequently asked is how the 
positive benefits of informal finance can be expanded and improved so its contributions can 
be increased. 
Researchers face a challenging task in conducting studies of and evaluating policy 
alternatives for informal finance. There are no well-defined theoretical and methodological 
tools to guide research in the way that bank-firm theory serves as a standard framework for 
studying formal finance. The following section highlights some of the issues in developing 
an ideal framework to examine informal finance. 
THEORIES AND FRAMEWORKS TO STUDY INFORMAL FINANCE 
There are a number of unique features of financial market transactions compared to 
transactions in other factor and product markets that create special research problems. A 
wide variety of contractual arrangements exist in financial markets in which a loan is 
exchanged in the current period for a promise to repay it in the future. The fulfillment of 
the promise, however, is influenced by exogenous and endogenous risks that affect borrow-
ers. While exogenous risks are due to random shocks, endogenous risks arise because of 
borrower incentives to default and because of asymmetric information so that lenders cannot 
perfectly screen borrowers and enforce contracts (Hoff and Stiglitz). Therefore, rural 
financial markets tend to be highly segmented due to variations in financial technologies 
used by lenders for screening and enforcement (Esguerra and Meyer). Furthermore, since 
rural financial markets generally operate in environments where contingent markets are 
incomplete or absent, financial contracts must incorporate insurance features. 
: 
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Although informal financial markets are faced with these inherent problems, they 
have a comparative advantage over formal financial institutions in their ability to internalize 
the externalities caused by information problems and exogenous risks. Complex interlinked 
loan contracts are often designed to mitigate or accommodate exogenous and endogenous 
risks in a given institutional environment. Peer monitoring and transactions among partic-
ipants with established social and familial relations are effectively used to reduce 
information problems. Therefore, moral hazard and adverse selection problems, which can 
occur under asymmetric information, are not as prominent in informal as in formal financial 
markets.2 Informal financial markets effectively use collateral substitutes such as factor and 
product market linkages and third party guarantees to overcome rigid collateral require-
ments which restrict access in formal financial markets.3 Furthermore, the engenderment 
of reciprocal obligations and risk-sharing contracts observed in informal finance function as 
insurance substitutes (Platteau and Abraham). Interest rates are often more flexible in in-
formal than in formal finance so financial contracts can adjust more easily to differences in 
costs and risks. The flexibility of informal financial contracts and the heterogeneity of the 
financial agents makes it difficult to quantitatively model informal finance. A robust 
framework is required for analysis, however, in order to understand the structure of informal 
finance, the nature of financial contracts, and the efficiency of financial transactions. 
Several theories and economic frameworks used to study formal, semi-formal and 
informal finance are outlined in Table 2. Bank-firm, contract and insurance theories have 
been effectively used to examine the supply and demand sides of formal financial institu-
tions. The frameworks of the new institutional economics and the new household economics 
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have used club theory in addition to bank-firm and insurance theories to study semi-formal 
finance. The normative nature of the new household economics guides rational choice and 
decision making of borrowers under risk, uncertainty and costless markets (Singh, Squire and 
Strauss). On the other hand, the new institutional economics incorporates transaction and 
information costs that arise under a given institutional environment to explain the 
contractual relations between lenders and borrowers (Eggertsson; Floro and Yotopoulos). 
The theoretical tools developed for formal and semi-formal finance are used to 
examine contractual relations between anonymous lenders and borrowers. They are not 
appropriate, however, to analyze informal finance where the identity and reputation of the 
contracting parties influence the multifaceted transactions conducted among heterogenous 
participants. Empirical studies of informal finance, therefore, have often relied on hypo-
thetical conjectures based on artificial paradigms or have simply limited themselves to 
descriptive analysis. Recent studies have attempted to more rigorously evaluate informal 
contractual arrangements and market stmcture.4 The new institutional economics, the new 
household economics and neo-institutional economics have been employed to analyze the 
behavior of informal financial market participants and to explain complex informal contrac-
tual arrangements. For instance, the bulk of the literature on interlinked credit contracts 
follows the new institutional economics framework using the theories of games, contracts, 
and insurance under the axioms of microeconomics.5 These models explain the existence 
of heterogenous interlinked contractual arrangements as a means to economize on transac-
tion and information costs. While models based on game theory consider interlinked con-
tracts between lenders and borrowers as a repetitive game that incorporates reputation and 
• 
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pre-commitments in terms of reciprocity, the models based on insurance theory explain 
interlinked contracts as insurance substitutes.6 These models are theoretically appealing, 
but they have limited empirical application because of data problems. The empirical 
regularities of informal contractual arrangements are better explained by the positive nature 
of neo-institutional economics framework that integrates both the institutional and 
household economics frameworks (Eggertsson). 
The multiplicity of frameworks identified above might suggest the availability of well 
developed methodological tools to study informal finance. The segmentation of informal 
financial markets and the heterogeneity among the contracts, however, inhibit the 
development of a single model that will capture the details of most of the transactions. The 
basic structure of informal financial markets are often subject to controversies so there is 
a lack of consensus about how to study them, especially in developing countries. This has 
led to a proliferation of conflicting propositions based on divergent models. The 
contradicting explanations provided to rationalize high interest rates charged in informal 
credit markets is one example.7 Consequently, these conflicting opinions have confused 
policy makers regarding the role of informal finance in the development process. 8 
It can be concluded that the several theories and frameworks used to study informal 
finance are as heterogenous and controversial as the informal financial markets themselves. 
Therefore, research on informal financial markets is confronted with unresolved issues such 
as : (i) What is the structure of informal financial markets? Are they competitive, monopo-
listic or contestable? (ii) How can the terms and conditions of differentiated informal 
financial contracts from heterogenous lenders in a given institutional environment be 
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explained by a plausible framework that incorporates costs and risks? These issues need to 
be addressed if we are to adequately evaluate the role of informal finance in the 
development process and to suggest appropriate policies. 
POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
Several policy alternatives have been suggested for informal finance in developing 
countries. Some implicitly propose controlling or reducing informal transactions because 
they are rooted in the old exploitation school of thought. Others follow the newer approach 
in which informal finance is perceived as providing valuable services. The difficulty in 
generalizing about informal finance is due to its heterogeneity and to the lack of a consistent 
framework for analysis. 
The purpose of this section is to summarize five policy alternatives that are found in 
the developing country literature. It is important to understand the nature of these 
recommendations even though there is little consensus about when, where and for which 
type of informal finance they apply.9 
1. Benign neglect. Those who are most frustrated about the negative experience of 
two decades of supply-leading formal finance argue that the worst thing to do would be to 
meddle with informal finance. They argue that past failures demonstrate the difficulty of 
effectively developing a financial system through government efforts. Attempts to intervene 
in informal financial markets could result in the same negative consequences. Efforts to 
"use" informal finance as a development strategy may damage or destroy its integrity. Part 
• 
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of its rationale derives precisely from its informality and immunity from official regulation 
(Chandavarkar). 
2. Regulate and supervise. Although informal finance may be ubiquitous in 
developing countries and successfully operate in environments where formal finance fails, 
a number of problems exist which lead some analysts to argue that social welfare would 
likely increase with some degree of government regulation and supervision. 10 The 
problems identified include the perception that interlinked credit transactions are 
exploitative, that participants in group savings arrangements run the risk of losing their 
savings, and that the self regulation of cooperatives and credit unions is too weak to prevent 
abuses. Besides the possibility of systematic abuse, there are also the normal financial 
problems such as excessive portfolio concentration of localized institutions operating in areas 
with high covariance in income. 
The regulations that are proposed to avoid or reduce these problems range from the 
simple establishment of minimum conditions for obtaining operating licenses to more 
complex rules about portfolio diversification, lending to insiders, capital requirements, 
bookkeeping and accounting procedures, and contract terms and conditions. Reporting 
requirements and supervisory procedures are also recommended. 
Some successful attempts to regulate informal finance exist, such as with the licensing 
of pawnshops in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. There is much skepticism about regulation, 
however, because of the regulatory failure that has frequently occurred in formal finance. 
The first priority, therefore, would seem to be to improve regulation and supervision of 
formal finance before trying to extend it to the greater complexity of informal finance. 
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Another problem is that governments may implicitly incur additional unwanted liabilities if 
they attempt to license and regulate informal agents and transactions. 
3. Imitate informal finance. Since informal finance has prospered m many 
environments where formal finance has failed, there is an obvious implication that informal 
finance must be doing something correct that should be imitated by formal finance. This 
alternative implies discovering the technologies and procedures that make informal finance 
work, and transferring them to formal finance. 
To a degree, imitation is already occurring. One of the important comparative 
advantages of informal finance is access to information useful for screening participants and 
peer monitoring (Burkett). For example, members of savings clubs and ROSCAs tend to 
know each other; otherwise they will not undertake group activities. Likewise, trader 
lenders and input suppliers accumulate information about potential borrowers through their 
other transactions. The highly touted Grameen Bank in Bangladesh uses group lending 
techniques similar to those employed by informal groups (Hossain). The borrowing groups 
use their informational advantages to screen and monitor their members so that bank 
operating costs and loan losses are reduced. Other techniques such as mobile banks and 
collection agents have been employed in some rural credit programs to reduce costs by 
bringing financial institutions closer to their client. These innovations can reduce 
transaction costs for both borrower and lender. 
Apart from these examples, it is difficult to imagine many ways that formal finance 
can imitate informal techniques. The comparative advantage of formal financial institutions 
is that they conduct large scale, low margin transactions in which formal bureaucratic proce-
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dures substitute for personal relations and first-hand knowledge. This discourages them 
from servicing clients for which information and transaction costs are large relative to loan 
size. 
4. Link formal with informal. The idea behind this alternative is that financial 
services can be expanded to the poor most efficiently by linking formal with informal 
finance. This approach is being actively promoted in Indonesia where self-help groups are 
being formed to mobilize group savings that are deposited in banks as guarantees for loans 
to the group (Seibel and Parhusing). Many governments and donors are now channeling 
funds for on-lending through credit unions and informal groups rather than through agri-
cultural or commercial banks. The hope is that these groups will be able to lend and 
recover the funds more efficiently than formal institutions, many of which have failed when 
trying to serve rural clientele. 
One problem with using informal finance as a conduit for funds is group dynamics. 
The credit union experience in many Latin American countries illustrates the problem. 
When they were first organized and operated with their own savings in the 1950s and 1960s, 
many were healthy, self-sustaining institutions. In the 1970s, however, many began to lend 
borrowed funds and this changed their operations from being saver-dominated to borrower-
dominated (Poyo ). Savings mobilization was ignored, interest rates were not properly 
adjusted for costs and inflation, and loan recovery declined. There is not yet any clear 
understanding about the appropriate incentive structure to use so that external funds do not 
destroy these groups. 
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5. Graduate informal into formal. Many advocates of credit for the poor believe 
that formal institutions, even under liberalized financial conditions, will never lend signi-
ficant amounts of funds to groups currently without access. Therefore, it is argued that 
NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and PVOs (private voluntary organizations) that 
attempt to serve marginal groups must eventually evolve into financial institutions 
(Boomgard). Rather than pursue the popular strategy of trying to graduate poor clients 
from specialized lending agencies to commercial banking facilities, the entire program needs 
to graduate. 
Some attempts to formalize or scale up informal financial arrangements are already 
taking place. The Grameen Bank became a formal bank after several years operating as 
a program linked to existing banks. Credit union development programs are being deve-
loped in Africa based on the widespread incidence of moneykeepers and savings groups. 
Credit union central liquidity funds are being created in the Philippines and Portugal to link 
individual credit unions together as a way to spread risk and allocate funds among deficit 
and surplus units. These developments are relatively simple, however, compared to the 
large task implied by trying to convert many of the existing NGOs and PVOs into financial 
intermediaries. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Informal finance consists of a variety of individual and group financial arrangements 
and contracts. Many types of informal finance can be found in most developing countries. 
Often they provide the only financial services available to the poor, to small farmers, to the 
• 
• 
15 
landless, and to other groups that lack access to formal finance. Although informal finance 
is ubiquitous and provides important financial services for many people, it's role in the 
development process is subject to debate. Many researchers and policy makers still 
characterize it as being exploitative of people who have no choice but to rely on informal 
finance. Others believe that informal finance makes positive contributions to development 
precisely because it provides services not provided by formal finance. 
One of the reasons that explains the divergent views about informal finance is the 
lack of a clear set of theories and framework for use in studying it. The study of formal 
finance has been able to successfully adopt the tools of bank-firm theory to examine the 
behavior of formal financial institutions in developing countries. The complexity of informal 
finance makes it impossible to use a single framework to study its characteristics and perfor-
mance. It is difficult, therefore, to arrive at a commonly accepted set of theoretical 
propositions to explain why informal finance exists, how financial terms and conditions are 
formed, and whether or not social welfare will be improved by some form of government 
intervention. 
There is an urgent need to more fully understand informal finance. The collapse of 
the rural formal financial system in many developing countries is causing concern about the 
possible impact on production, technological change and rural incomes. The sluggish re-
sponse of formal finance to recent attempts to liberalize and privatize rural financial 
markets has raised doubts about the ability of formal financial institutions to effectively 
serve the needs of agriculture, but at the same time informal finance is often not regarded 
as an effective substitute. 
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Policy alternatives ranging from benign neglect to actively promoting formal-informal 
financial linkages have been proposed in the research that has been completed to date. 
Although these recommendations may have relevance for specific cases, there is no general 
understanding about the appropriate set of policies to use towards informal finance. Much 
more work must be done to conceptualize and empirically study informal financial arrange-
ments, their strengths and their weaknesses. Fortunately, there is generally a more positive 
attitude towards informal finance today than existed several years ago. This situation makes 
it easier to objectively conduct the large amount of research that is needed so that more 
appropriate policies can be developed to ensure the most positive impact of informal finance 
on development. 
' .. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Examples can be found in the literature where attempts have been made to establish 
definitions, at least for the purposes of individual studies. Recent examples include 
Bouman; Chandavarkar; Germidies, Kessler and Meghir; Ghate; and Lamberte and 
Balbosa. 
2. Bell claims that informal financial markets face problems of moral hazard due to 
asymmetric information rather than adverse selection, while Siamwalla et.al., assume 
symmetric information among informal credit market participants. Nonetheless, they 
argue that information problems are better managed in informal than in formal 
finance. 
3. Transactions are said to be interlinked when the contracting parties trade in more 
than one market on the condition that terms and conditions of all trades are jointly 
determined (Bell). 
4. See for example Bardhan; Basu; Bell; Bhaduri; and Mitra. 
5. See Bardhan; Bell; and Quibria for a state of the art review on interlinked contracts. 
6. See Roth for a game theory model that incorporates reputation, and Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig for a model based on insurance theory. 
7. While some perceive high interest rates as surplus extraction by exploitative lenders 
(Basu; Bhaduri}, others justify it as a risk premium required to compensate for the 
high risks faced by lenders (Bottomly). 
8. The emphasis on usury laws in the Philippines in the 1960s, and the subsequent 
policy to relax them and use informal lenders as conduits for formal finance in the 
1980s are due in part to conflicting evaluations of informal finance. 
9. Insightful discussions about policy alternatives for informal finance are found in 
Adams and Ghate; Chandavarkar; and Ghate. 
10. See, for example, Floro and Y otopoulos. 
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Table 1 
Important Components of the Rural Financial System 
Formal 
Regional and National 
Central Banks, Treasury, 
and Other Regulatory 
Bodies 
Financial Intermediaries: 
Commercial Banks 
Development Banks 
Savings Banks 
Postal Savings 
Cooperative Banks 
Unit Rural Banks 
Finance Corporations 
Capital Markets 
Semi-Formal 
Agricultural Cooperatives 
Credit Unions 
Banques Populaires 
Integrated Dev. Projects 
Village Banks 
Self-Help Groups 
Savings Clubs 
Informal 
Communal Clubs 
Mutual Aid Associations 
ROSCAs 
Moneylenders 
Moneykeepers/Mobile Bankers 
Input Suppliers 
Storeowners/Merchants 
Trader-lenders 
Farmer-lenders 
Friends 
Neighbors 
Relatives/Family 
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Table 2 
Theories and Frameworks to Study Rural Financial Markets 
Formal Semi-formal 
Theories 
Bank-Firm theory under: Bank-Firm theory under: 
a) Asymmetric, incomplete a) Lender dominated 
and imperfect information institutions 
b) Risks and uncertainty b) Borrower dominated 
Insurance theory 
Contract theory 
institutions 
Insurance theory 
Club theory under: 
a) Exclusive and non-
exclusive contracts 
b) Queuing models 
Frameworks 
Informal 
Game theory 
Insurance theory 
Contract theory 
Supply side: profit 
maximization 
New institutional economics New institutional economics 
Demand side: New 
household economics 
New household economics New household economics 
Neo-institutional economics 
• 
• 
• 
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